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An Analysis of New York's Proposed
Multiple-Party Bank Account Law
INTRODUCTION
D URING the past twelve years, ten proposals for change in the
New York banking law governing ownership in joint bank ac-
counts have been presented to the New York legislature." The lat-
est proposal,2 Senate Bill No. 4893A and Assembly Bill No.
6547A, was introduced to the 1984 legislature and has not been
reported out of the banking committee.8 The primary objective of
these proposals has been to remove the joint tenancy provision of
section 675 of the banking law,4 thereby eliminating the deposi-
tor's creation of a "present gift of one-half" of the funds in the
account to his or her co-depositor. 5 The proposals have also at-
1. Recommendations of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature, 1983 N.Y. LAWS
2228; 1982 N.Y. LAWS 2324; 1979 N.Y. LAws 1469; 1978 N.Y. LAws 1659; 1977 N.Y. LAWS
2236; 1976 N.Y. LAws 2239; 1975 N.Y. LAWS 1547; 1974 N.Y. LAWS 1901; 1973 N.Y. LAWS
2111. These proposals were to amend section 675 of the current law. N.Y. BANKING LAW §
675 (McKinney 1979). See also infra note 2 and accompanying text.
2. See Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the 1983 Legislature, 1984 Mc-
KINNEY'S SESSioN L. NEWS, A-426 [hereinafter cited as Commission Report].
3. The 1984 proposal amends § 675 and adds Article XIII-F, which contains §§ 680-
685.
4. The current joint tenancy provision reads as follows:
When a deposit of cash, securities, or other property has been made or shall
hereafter be made in or with any banking organization or foreign banking cor-
poration transacting business in this state. . . in the name of such depositor or
shareholder and another person and in form to be paid or delivered to either,
or the survivor of them, such deposit or shares . . . shall become the property
of such persons as joint tenants ....
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 675(a) (McKinney 1979).
5. The "present gift of one-half" concept originally arose with the enactment of legis-
lation in 1907 whereby the property held by depositors in a joint account was owned by
them as joint tenants. See 1907 N.Y. LAWS 456. Prior to this, there existed at common law a
presumption that joint accounts were opened for convenience and no present gift of the
funds was intended. See, e.g., Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940, 6 N.Y.S. 556
(1889). This presumption survives today in the area of joint safe deposit boxes. In a 1982
matrimonial case, the Second Department held that funds placed in a joint safe deposit box
did not create a right to half the money in the box (as would have been the case if the
funds were in a joint bank account). The court ruled that "[t]he common law rules of joint
tenancy apply to a joint safe deposit box." Troiano v. Troiano, 87 A.D.2d 588, 447
N.Y.S.2d 753 (2d Dep't 1982).
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tempted to clarify joint depositors' rights regarding survivorship.
At present, section 675(a) provides that a deposit of cash, securi-
ties, or other property in a bank account in the name of'a deposi-
tor and another person creates a right of survivorship. The cur-
rent proposal of the Law Revision Commission (the Commission)
differs from earlier bills in that it provides for a right of election
regarding the survivorship provision.'
On September 28, 1983, the New York legislature added sec-
tion 675(c) to the banking law. The new subsection directs the
state banking board to promulgate rules requiring joint tenants of
bank accounts to "be informed of the terms and conditions of the
account including the relationship and consequences between the
parties in the account and the responsibilities of the institution with
which the account is established."7 This measure is stopgap, how-
ever, and full compliance will require additional amendments to
banking legislation to clarify the law.
Courts have traditionally experienced difficulty when trying
6. Thus, a depositor would be given the opportunity to direct the disposition of the
funds in a joint account in accordance with his or her individual preference. Under ex-
isting law, however, the opening of a joint account in statutory form is prima facie evi-
dence of intent to create a survivorship account. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 675(b) (McKinney
1979). One way in which a person contesting the survivor's title to the account may rebut
the presumption of survivorship is to establish that the account was created only for conve-
nience. See, e.g., In re Estate of Coddington, 56 A.D.2d 697, 391 N.Y.S.2d 710 (3d Dep't
1977). In Coddington, the decedent's wife attempted to rebut the presumption of survivor-
ship regarding a joint bank account opened in the name of decedent and his mother. The
court held that even though decedent had at one time withdrawn most of the funds in the
account, the evidence was insufficient to overcome the prima facie presumption that a joint
testamentary disposition had been created. Establishing that an account was opened for
convenience can prove difficult due to the evidentiary restrictions imposed by New York's
"Dead Man's Statute." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4519 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984). This
law prohibits an interested witness from testifying as to a conversation had with the dece-
dent concerning a particular matter unless the testimony of the deceased can be introduced
into evidence (e.g., the deceased's prior deposition is available). Normally, such testimony is
unavailable.
7. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 675(c) (McKinney Supp. 1983). In response to the legislative
mandate of § 675(c), the Banking Board adopted a new General Regulation part 15 on
June 28, 1984, to clarify the rights of joint depositors. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 153
(1984). As of October 1, 1984, banks are required to explain in greater detail the legal
implications ofjoint tenancy; however, the disclosure requirements of part 15,3 of the new
regulation fail to address the differences between a convenience account and a true joint
account, and also do not inform the depositor that by opening a true joint account, he is
presumed to have intended a gift of half the funds in the account to the co-depositor.
Therefore, the regulation is not amenable to solving the problems which have plagued
surrogates for decades.
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to conform section 675 to the intentions of many persons utilizing
joint bank accounts." The recent passage of section 675(c) may be
viewed as an attempt on the part of the legislature to solve some
of the problems inherent in the law of joint accounts. This Com-
ment illustrates, however, that more extensive corrective mea-
sures are needed and that serious consideration should be given to
the recommendations embodied in Senate-Bill 4893A and Assem-
bly Bill 6547A. Toward this end, certain provisions of the Com-
mission's proposed bill are analyzed, especially those relating to
spousal accounts, recordkeeping, and creditors' rights.9 This Com-
ment also compares the current proposal to the laws in other ju-
risdictions and to the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC) dealing with multiple-party accounts.' This examination
should reveal that the current proposal will more adequately
achieve the objective of complying with the depositor's intentions
8. See, e.g., Marrow v. Moskowitz, 255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460 (1931). In Marrow, the
depositor opened a joint savings account with her granddaughter, to be "payable to either
or the survivor." The depositor later revoked the "privilege" granted her granddaughter
by withdrawing the funds, and then re-deposited the funds in the same type of joint ac-
count with the granddaughter. Soon after, the depositor died. The executor of her estate
tried to recover funds paid by the bank to the granddaughter on the theory that survivor-
ship was not intended, but the Court of Appeals held for the granddaughter. Also illustra-
tive is Matter of Lang, 76 Misc. 2d 263, 351 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sur. Ct.), rev'd sub. nom. Klein-
berg v. Heller, 45 A.D.2d 514, 360 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1st Dep't 1984), rev'd, 38 N.Y.2d 836,
345 N.E.2d 592, 382 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976). In that case, an account was established in the
names of an elderly woman and her niece. The niece withdrew more than her moiety and
was ordered by the Surrogate to turn over excess funds. The Appellate Division held that
she did not have to turn over the excess, but the Court of Appeals reversed.
The Executive Committee of the Surrogates' Association of New York expressed its
opinion on this issue in December 1982 when it adopted a resolution advocating the crea-
tion of an entirely new section of the banking law covering joint convenience accounts.
Under the proposal, the person named on the account for the convenience of the depositor
would bear the burden of proving that any withdrawals he or she made were for the bene-
fit of the depositor. See Letter of Louis D. Laurino, Chairman of the Exec. Comm. of
Surrogates' Ass'n of New York, to Ms. Carolyn Gentile, Chairwoman of the Law Revision
Comm'n (Dec. 13, 1982).
9. For an extensive discussion of other related areas such as the tax consequences of
joint bank accounts, wrongful withdrawals, and the "present gift of one-half' rationale, see
Note, Modifing the Joint Tenancy Strictures ofJoint Bank Accounts in New York, 45 ALB. L. Rxv.
206 (1980).
10. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101 to 6-113, 8 U.L.A. 519-33 (1982). The Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) was promulgated by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association on August 13, 1969, as an effort to modernize and unify American probate
laws. It represents the culmination of thirty years of effort to reform the probate laws,
which had been the subject of much public criticism. See generally Wellman, The Uniform
Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. Rv. 453 (1970).
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than does existing law. The adoption of certain provisions of the
proposed bill is recommended, and suggestions are made regard-
ing other aspects of the bill in terms of administration and
practicability.
I. THE 1984 LAW REVISION COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Husband and Wife Joint Accounts
Under existing section 675, joint accounts maintained by
married persons are handled in the same manner as all other joint
accounts. Courts have construed section 675 as creating equal in-
terests in spousal co-depositors regardless of the source of the
funds, absent clear evidence to the contrary.11 In the Commis-
sion's bill, joint accounts in the names of husband and wife are
accorded special treatment: withdrawals by either spouse are "pre-
sumed to be for the benefit of the depositor who contributed the
funds to the account unless it is established by a preponderance of
the evidence that this was not the case."1
12
Never before has the Commission proposed such a distinc-
tion. Its decision to do so now was founded on a desire to prevent
inequities in marital situations which may arise when one spouse
contributes most or all of the funds to an account while the other
spouse makes the non-monetary contributions to the marriage.1
Of course, this presumption does not necessarily mean that the
non-working spouse will receive more than half the funds in a
joint account, but a court would be empowered to require this
result if the circumstances so warrant.
A recent example of the problems which can develop under
present law is United States Trust Company v. McSweeney,14 where
the defendant wife was held liable to the plaintiff bank for over-
11. Angelo v. Angelo, 74 A.D.2d 327, 330, 428 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (2d Dep't 1980);
Glass v. Glass, 35 Misc. 2d 665, 666, 231 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329, affd, 26 A.D.2d 772, 272
N.Y.S.2d 970 (1962); McGuigan v. McGuigan, 140 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
12. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-448. It should be noted that under New
York's equitable distribution law, N.Y. DOM. REL LAw § 236B (McKinney Supp. 1984), title
is irrelevant. The presumption set up in the proposed bill may, however, affect the divorce
court's decision as to what is "equitable."
13. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-441.




drafts which resulted when the bank honored checks she wrote
against a joint account in the name of her husband and herself.
Liability was found even though she claimed that she acted at her
husband's direction and that the checks did not benefit her. Fur-
thermore, all deposits credited to the couple's account during the
period in question were allocated entirely to the husband's over-
drafts, and none to the wife's. The court ruled that the wife's
claims did "nothing to change her status as a drawer, nor did they
affect the liability to the bank that flows from that status.
' 15
The court's reasoning in McSweeney is sound if it is analyzed in
terms of a debtor/creditor relationship between any bank and its
depositor. While it is not practical to suggest that the bank be-
come concerned with the personal relationship between husband
and wife depositors in a situation such as this, the question never-
theless arises as to whether this debtor/creditor principle should
be similarly interpreted in cases involving spousal joint accounts,
which include the vast majority of such accounts. Naturally, the
presumption that withdrawals made are for the benefit of the con-
tributing depositor would not affect the bank's overall rights as a
creditor on the account. However, since a factual determination
of the issues raised bythe wife must be made by a jury, this pre-
sumption might lend weight to her argument that she should not
be liable for the entire amount of the overdrafts since she acted at
her husband's direction and for his benefit.
Section 682(d) of the proposed bill is specifically subordinated
to the New York equitable distribution law.' 6 Thus, in divorce
cases, the rights of the non-contributing spouse would be safe-
guarded to the fullest extent possible.'7 Prior to the advent of the
equitable distribution law, marital assets were divided according to
title in the property.'8 Under equitable distribution, title is no
15. McSweeney, 91 A.D.2d at 9, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 278. The couple's account was com-
pletely exhausted when the litigation commenced.
16. N.Y. DOM. REt LAw § 236B (McKinney Supp. 1984).
17. If, as is suggested above, the husband contributed most of the funds to the account
while the wife contributed her non-compensable time and services to the marriage, the
"net contributions" theory of proposed section 682(b), Commission Report, supra note 2, at
A-448, standing alone would result in disparate treatment for the wife. By including pro-
posed sections 682(c) and (d), id., the wife is provided an opportunity to receive an equita-
ble portion of the funds.
18. When New York enacted its equitable distribution law in 1980, it became one of
the last states to adopt such a system. As of 1980, forty states, including the District of
Columbia, had adopted an equitable distribution law, eight states were community prop-
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longer the controlling factor,19 and thus presumptions about title
created by the law of joint tenancy have no impact. Instead,
"property accumulated during the marriage should be distributed
in a manner which reflects the individual needs and circumstances
of the parties.
20
There appears to be no doubt among New York courts that
funds held in joint bank accounts are subject to equitable distribu-
tion. In Jolis v. Jolis,21 the first case to be decided in New York
County under the equitable distribution law' the money deposited
in the couple's joint savings account was considered marital prop-
erty and conceded to be subject to the new statute.22 Similarly, in
Jacoby v. Jacoby,'$ a case arising in Queens County Supreme Court,
a divorcing couple's joint savings accounts represented their pri-
mary source -of assets and each spouse scrambled to transfer funds
from the accounts in anticipation of marital dissolution. The mat-
rimonial action was instituted on January 19, 1981; during the
week prior to the action, a total of $116,770 was maneuvered
among nine accounts held in four separate banks in an effort to
avoid the legal effects of equitable distribution. Plaintiff wife
withdrew approximately $20,000, while defendant husband with-
drew $96,000, using part of the funds to open new accounts in his
name in trust for two of their children. The court, relying on case
law and a noted authority on the subject of equitable distribution
law,25 found that the transfers constituted fraudulent conveyances
by each spouse and decided to "disregard the title and transfer of
the marital assets between January 13, 1981 and January 19, 1981
• . . and for the purposes of equitable distribution . . . treat all
such transfers as part and parcel of the marital estate.' 2 When
making the designation as to how the couple's marital property
was to be distributed, the court considered the fact that, although
erty states, and three remained title states. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the United States: An
Overview 14 FAM. L.Q. 229, 249-50 (1981).
19. Leibowits v. Leibowits, 93 A.D.2d 535, 540, 462 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472 (2d Dep't
1983).
20. Memorandum of Approval of Governor Hugh Carey, 1980 N.Y. LAWS 1863.
21. 111 Misc. 2d 965, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1981).
22. Id. at 971, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
23. 187 N.Y.L.J. 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. The Court relied on Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 1 (1981).
26. Jacoby v. Jacoby, 187 N.Y.LU. 18, 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982).
820 [Vol. 33
JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
the husband was the sole "breadwinner," the wife had contrib-
uted to the marriage. The court also heard the testimony of an
economics expert as to the value of the household services ren-
dered by her. This factor, in addition to others required for con-
sideration by statute,27 resulted in the court's awarding forty per-
cent of the marital property (consisting principally of the liquid
assets in the joint savings accounts) to the wife and sixty percent
to the husband. Thus, the application of the equitable distribution
law produced a substantial sum for the wife even though she did
not contribute the actual funds to any .of the various joint
accounts.
Clearly, the equitable distribution law is fulfilling the role it
was designed to play regarding the distribution of marital prop-
erty, including assets in joint bank accounts, and it is essential that
the provision whereby the equitable distribution law takes prece-
dent be retained in any proposed bill for the modification of sec-
tion 675.
B. Recordkeeping
Another aspect of the proposed bill which must be considered
is the effect its passage would have upon the recordkeeping duties
of the parties. As noted above, the proposed legislation eliminates
the joint tenancy provision from the law governing joint bank ac-
counts, replacing it with a presumption that each depositor owns
his or her net contributions unless it can be successfully estab-
lished that this was not the intent of the co-depositQrs. This lan-
guage paraphrases that of UPC section 6-103a;28 the comment to
that section indicates that the amounts on deposit are to be attrib-
uted so as to reflect individual, beneficial ownership of funds dur-
ing the lifetimes of the parties. Under the proposed legislation,
net contributions would be calculated by adding the total of all
deposits of one depositor, less all withdrawals by the same deposi-
tor, plus a pro rata share of interest amounts to which that deposi-
tor is entitled.29
27. The equitable distribution law lists ten factors which courts are to consider when
making distributive awards. N.Y. DOM. Rr. LAw § 236B(5)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
28. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-103(a), 8 U.L.A. 523 (1982).
29. See Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-449 (proposed section 684(a)). See also
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101(6), 8 U.L.A. 520 (1982). These withdrawals would be pre-
sumed to be for the benefit of the spouse who contributed the funds in a spousal joint
1984]
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Accurate recordkeeping becomes particularly important
under the proposed legislation because there would no longer be
a statutory presumption that each co-depositor is entitled to a
moiety.30 The Commission considered this, but it concluded that
the task of keeping records would not be more burdensome than
it had been in the past because passbook entries would continue to
be the accepted means of tracking the disposition of funds in a
joint account.3 " The potential for problems in the area of record-
keeping also was discussed in a report prepared by the Banking
Law Committee of the Banking, Corporation and Business Law
Section of the New York Bar Association, and that committee
predicted difficulties in tracing transactions and determining the
ownership of funds in joint accounts, especially in light of the ex-
panded use of electronic banking.32 In response, the Commission
correctly pointed out that the identity of the withdrawer of funds
is concealed today in all joint accounts, electronic or not.33 The
Commission stressed that "[t]here can be no guarantees that
claimants will be able to prove their allegations that co-depositors
withdrew more than their moieties under existing law, or that
account under proposed section 682(c). The following hypothetical illustrates the operation
of proposed section 682(c): A couple's joint account has a balance of $750, $500 derived
from H's income and $250 from W's. W withdraws $250 from the account by writing a
check to make a payment on an automobile registered in H's name. To determine whether
the $250 withdrawal is to be attributed entirely to the $500 of H, or proportionately to H's
and W's amounts of deposit, it is first necessary to characterize the automobile, If it is the
family car, it is considered a family asset regardless of title, and W cannot rebut the pre-
sumption that payment was partly for her benefit. Thus, the $250 withdrawal would be
allocated two-thirds to the $500 of H on deposit, and one-third to the $250 of IV. If, on the
other hand, the vehicle in question were a special antique automobile owned by H rather
than a family asset, W might successfully rebut the section 682 presumption, and the entire
$250 would be applied to reduce the $500 H has on deposit, as the payment did not benefit
W. It should be emphasized that such tracing of net contributions is used only when credi-
tors are attempting to reach the interests of the joint depositor; it would not affect divorce
situations, where equitable distribution law is paramount.
30. A "moiety," in this context, is one-half the amount of property in an account gov-
erned by joint tenancy.
31. Since passbook or statement accounts do not indicate who actually makes the with-
drawals or deposits, it is up to the individual depositor to keep records of his own
transactions.
32. BANKING LAW COMMITTEE OF THE BANKING, CORPORATION, AND BUSINESS LAW SEC-
TION, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION LEGISLATIVE REPORT No. 49 (1982).
33. Memorandum from Joyce Pulliam, Associate Att'y of the N.Y. State Law Revision
Comm'n, to Senator Rolison, Chairman, Senate Banking Comm. and Assemblyman Farrell,
Chairman, Assembly Banking Comm. (May 5, 1983) (discussing objections to the Comm'n's
proposed 1982 and 1983 bills regarding section 675 of the banking law).
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non-contributing depositors wrongfully withdrew under our pro-
posed statute. The burden is on the challenger to prove his or her
allegations."' 4 Thus, the Commission bill would not create any
new difficulties in determining the ownership of funds in a joint
account and would result in an equitable resolution of disputes as
to wrongful withdrawals.
Proposed section 684 relieves banks of the burden of proof
regarding the calculation of net contributions. 5 Under this provi-
sion, the bank is under no obligation to determine the source of
the funds received for deposit or the use to which withdrawn
funds are put; the burden of proof lies with the depositors.3 This
policy represents a natural extension of the language in present
section 675(a), under which a bank's obligation to pay is released
upon delivery of the funds on account to either co-depositor in
the absence of written notice to the contrary. The drafters of
this legislation implicitly recognized the inherent administrative
difficulties in requiring that financial institutions keep records of
the source of funds. At the same time, they probably were sensi-
tive to the fact that any attempt to monitor the use to which with-
drawn funds are put would not only be virtually impossible but
also represent an invasion of privacy.
34. Id. at 3-4.
35. Proposed section 684(a) provides that a "financial institution owes no duty under
this article to any depositor, or a successor in interest, to determine the source of funds
received for deposit to a joint account, or to inquire as to the proposed application of any
sum withdrawn from an account." Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-449.
36. According to John E. Nagurney, Associate Counsel for Operations of Marine Mid-
land Bank, proposed section 684 "provides a fair amount of protection for financial institu-
tions"; he believes this is especially important in light of the holding in Brown v. Bowery
Savings Bank, 51 N.Y.2d 411, 415 N.E.2d 906, 434 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1980) (discussed infra
note 37). Interview with John E. Nagurney, Associate Counsel-Operations, Marine Midland
Bank, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Feb. 1, 1984).
37. It should be noted that a bank can be held liable under section 675(a) to a joint
tenant whose name has been removed from the joint account by the co-depositor without
the consent of that joint tenant. In Brown v. Bowery Savings Bank, 51 N.Y.2d 411, 415
N.E.2d 906, 434 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1980) a joint tenant whose name had been removed from
the joint bank account by her co-depositor without her consent sued the bank for paying
the funds to the person whose name was substituted for hers on the account. The Court of
Appeals held that the joint tenant whose name had been deleted was entitled to recover
from the bank half the funds in the account at the time the substituted joint tenant with-
drew the entire balance. Id. at 414, 415 N.E.2d at 907, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 917. The court
reasoned that the act of deleting the joint tenant's name from the account destroyed the
joint tenancy and created a half interest in the account for both parties. Therefore, the
withdrawal by the substituted joint tenant constituted conversion of those funds. Id.
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While the proposed statute would create paperwork for de-
positors in joint accounts, such burdens already are imposed in
certain circumstances under the present tax laws. 8 Moreover, the
problem of tracing the source of funds in a spousal account only
arises when a creditor is seeking to reach the funds of one spouse;
it does not occur in a divorce situation. The proposed bill would
not impose a heavier recordkeeping burden than is presently re-
quired, since similar tracing procedures are used under present
New York law to determine the extent of a spouse's interest in an
account when it is challenged by a creditor. 9
C. Creditors
Bank customers are largely unfamiliar with the rights of cred-
itors to reach funds deposited in joint accounts. Information pro-
vided by banks to customers interested in opening joint accounts
usually fails to provide any indication as to when such accounts
become subject to attachment by the creditor(s) of one deposi-
tor.40 Perhaps this is understandable, as the law regarding the
rights of creditors in this situation is not well defined. Two New
York cases illustrate this problem.
In Denton v. Grumbach,41 the plaintiff-creditor claimed that
$19,000 had been appropriated from him fraudulently, and there-
fore he had an order of attachment levied on the funds held by
defendants in a joint bank account. It was admitted in the course
of litigation that the plaintiff's dispute lay with only one of the
depositors of the joint account and that an order attaching, for
example, funds the non-debtor depositor held in a separate ac-
count would have been invalid.' 2 The non-debtor depositor ar-
38. See, e.g., Emmons v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1513, 1515 (1961) (two-fifths of
the interest on a joint bank account taxable to taxpayer where she had originally deposited
two-fifths of the funds in the account).
39. See infra note 47 and accompanying text. In addition, section 5-1.1(b)(3) of the
Estates, Powers and Trusts Law places the burden of proof on the surviving spouse to
determine the proportionate interest of the deceased spouse in a joint account maintained
by the deceased spouse and a third party depositor, for purposes of establishing the amount
to be included as a testamentary substitute subject to the surviving spouse's right of elec-
tion. N.Y. Esr. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1981).
40. The disclosure statement of one New York bank (Anchor Savings Bank FSB) is
over 1700 words long yet contains no reference to creditors' rights.
41. 2 A.D.2d 420, 157 N.Y.S.2d 91 (3d Dep't 1956).
42. Id. at 422, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 93. The joint account in question was apparently non-
spousal.
[Vol. 33824
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gued that the attachment should be lifted to preserve her right of
access to half the money in the account at any time.4 Plaintiff
contended that since the debtor depositor had a right of survivor-
ship in this joint tenancy relationship, the attachment affected the
entire account, not just the half presumably owned by the debtor
depositor." The court acknowledged that there is a rebuttable
presumption that depositors are joint tenants, and that joint te-
nants are "seized . ..by the half and the whole. '4 5 However,
since it was impossible to determine in this particular case what
the proportionate interests of each party really were, the court
refused to rely on the presumption that each defendant owned a
moiety and ruled that attachment against the whole amount in the
account was proper.46 The court concluded that section 924 of
the Civil Practice Act,4" under which a release of the non-debtor
43. The non-debtor depositor's argument was based on the "present gift of one-half"
idea as expressed in Matter of Suter, 258 N.Y. 104, 179 N.E. 310 (1932). Suter, in conjunc-
tion with a case decided one year earlier by the same court, Marrow v. Moskowitz, 255
N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460 (1931), created tremendous uncertainty in the case law governing
situations where wrongful withdrawals occurred, necessitating a need to determine
whether a gift of a moiety had been made by the contributing depositor to the co-deposi-
tor. In 1976, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the "present gift of one-half" notion. See
Kleinberg v. Heller, 38 N.Y.2d 836, 345 N.E.2d 592, 382 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976) (respondent
held obligated to return to the estate funds withdrawn in excess of her moiety).
44. Denton, 2 A.D.2d at 422, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
45. Id. The phrase "seized.. .by the half and the whole" is based on the common
law notion that each joint tenant owns an undivided whole interest in the property due to
the right of survivorship, yet is entitled to half the property at any time prior to death of
the other tenant. In the case of real property, both joint tenants must consent to convey
the entire property to a third party; however, "one joint tenant can convert a joint tenancy
into a tenancy in common unilaterally by conveying his interest to a third party," resulting
in a severance of the joint tenancy. J. DUmEMNIEM & J. KimER, PROPERTY 487 (1981). Simi-
larly, the New York Court of Appeals has held that the withdrawal of more than a moiety
by a joint depositor destroys the joint tenancy relationship and attending right of survivor-
ship as to those funds. See Kleinberg v. Heller, 38 N.Y.2d 836, 345 N.E.2d 592, 382
N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976).
46. Denton, 2 A.D.2d at 422, 157 N.Y.S.2d at 93. It is interesting to speculate as to
how this court would have ruled if one depositor had withdrawn more than half the funds
in the account prior to the suit and had then been sued by the true depositor for wrongful
withdrawal. Under the "present gift of one-half" presumption, the true depositor would be
able to recover only the excess over one-half of the funds in the account. See Bricker v.
Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d 22, 27, 191 N.E.2d 795, 797, 241 N.Y.S.2d 413, 416 (1963).
47." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 924 (McKinney 1962) (current version at N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
LAW §§ 5239, 6221 (McKinney 1980). Sections 5239 and 6221 deal with the procedure to
determine adverse claims. Under these sections, a special proceeding may be commenced
"against the judgment creditor or other person with whom a dispute exists to determine rights
in the property or debt ...." Id. (emphasis added) The sections go on to state that
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depositor's interest in the account could be granted, offered the
preferred remedy.
The Denton outcome is difficult to reconcile with that of In re
Granwell,48 a New York Court of Appeals decision involving com-
plex estate litigation. There, the estate of the deceased, Granwell,
was indebted to a son by a prior marriage by virtue of a separa-
tion agreement which the deceased had entered into with his first
wife. Granwell had contracted to pay his son half the amount of
any funds transferred during his lifetime if such transfers were
made in the form of a gift or to an inter vivos trust and were not
supported by full and adequate consideration. 49 At a later date,
Granwell purchased mutual funds and deposited some of them
into a joint account with his second wife; he did not pay his son an
amount equal to half his moiety in the mutual funds and further-
more made no provision in his will for his son, leaving his entire
estate to his second wife (the executrix).8 0 The trial court ruled
that the son was a creditor of the estate and that the transfer of
the funds to the wife was a fraudulent conveyance because it had
rendered the deceased's estate insolvent. The Appellate Division,
First Department, modified the order and held that the second
wife was not liable to the son for part of the mutual funds because
Granwell had no intent to defraud.51 On appeal, the state's high-
est court agreed with the trial court that a fraudulent conveyance
had occurred. The Court of Appeals noted that when a joint ac-
"[w]here there appear to be disputed questions of fact, the court shall order a separate
trial, indicating the person who shall have possession of the property .... Id. Thus, the
non-debtor depositor in Denton could now employ the procedural mechanisms of these sec-
tions as a means of introducing the evidence required to establish her claim to a portion of
the funds on deposit, if such evidence was available.
In this respect, it appears the court's analysis of section 675 of the banking law is incon-
gruous with the operation of sections 5239 and 6221 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules
(CPLR). Under the banking law, there is a presumption that the non-debtor depositor is
entitled to half the funds in the joint account, whereas there is no such presumption under
the CPLR. Therefore, if the non-debtor depositor does not have adequate proof of owner-
ship to satisfy the requirements of section 675, he or she will not have sufficient proof to
obtain a release under the CPLR either. The court's "solution" may be of little value to
the non-debtor depositor in such a situation.
48. 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1967).
49. Id. at 93, 228 N.E.2d at 780, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 785. Granwell also agreed to leave
his son the proceeds of his life insurance policies as well as half of his estate. Id. at 93-94,
228 N.E.2d at 780, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
50. Id. at 94, 228 N.E.2d at 780-81, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
51. 25 A.D.2d 824, 270 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1966).
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count is opened there is a presumption of joint tenancy, entitling
each depositor to a moiety or half the amount on deposit.52 Rely-
ing on this presumption, the court found that Granwell's second
wife was entitled to a gift of half the amount of the mutual funds
while he was alive; the other half was Granwell's property during
his lifetime and was subject to attachment by his creditors both
during life and after death, even though Granwell's interest had
at death passed to his second wife as survivor. 53
Although Denton has not been overruled, it is clearly at odds
with the dominant view expressed in Granwell and the Commis-
sion's view of the current law . 4 The Denton decision stands for
the proposition that if, for purposes of attachment by a creditor of
one depositor, it cannot be determined what the proportionate in-
terest of each depositor is, then that depositor can be presumed to
own all the funds in the account and the other none. The rebutta-
ble presumption introduced by legislation in 190951 and affirmed
by case law56 is effectively abolished. The court in Denton believed
the non-debtor depositor had only an expectancy of receiving the
entire amount in the account at the death of her co-depositor and
that no transfer to her of a moiety interest occurred until he died.
Therefore, all funds in the account were subject to attachment by
a creditor of the debtor depositor. In contrast, the Granwell court
indicated it would only allow creditors access to half the funds in a
joint account during lifetime even if all the funds were deposited
by the debtor.
57
The Commission's proposed legislation adopts the views of
the Denton court, at least as to creditor's rights against a joint
bank account. The bill provides that creditors may reach all of the
funds in the account in the absence of proof of net contribu-
tions.5 8 The Commission's adoption of the Denton viewpoint is
consistent with its contention that the presumption of a present
gift of a moiety results in confusion for the depositors and the
courts and should be eliminated. It must be emphasized that the
52. 20 N.Y.2d at 95, 228 N.E.2d at 781, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
53. Id. at 95-96, 228 N.E.2d at 781-82, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87.
54. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-443.
55. See 1909 N.Y. LAWS 13.
56. Matter of Bricker v. Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d 22, 27, 191 N.E.2d 795, 797, 241
N.Y.S.2d 413, 416 (1963).
57. Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d at 95-96, 228 N.E.2d at 781-82, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87.
58. See Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-449 (proposed § 685).
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bill would only allow, a creditor access to the entire account as a
last resort when the depositor's efforts to meet the burden of
proof regarding net contributions have failed.
A somewhat different situation occurred in McSweeney," in
which the bank itself became the creditor of the defendants under
the common law rule that "the payment of an overdraft consti-
tutes a loan by the bank to the drawer of the overdraft, a loan for
which the drawer is liable." 60 Defendant wife's overdrafts totaled
$16,811 and her husband's totalled $82,252. During the period of
time in question, $23,000 was deposited into the account, reduc-
ing the cumulative overdraft. The wife argued that a proportion-
ate share of the deposits should be used to reduce each of the
overdraft amounts. The court held that the bank could allocate
the entire amount of the deposit to reduce the husband's over-
drafts and allocate none to the wife's because, unless there is spec-
ification of the debt to which payment applies, the creditor may
allocate as it wishes. 1 It seems likely that the defendants did not
realize at the time the deposits were made that, as joint deposi-
tors, they were liable to each other for overdrafts and therefore
should have specified the debts to which the funds were to be ap-
plied. The court pointed out that there was nothing on the joint
signature card the depositors signed which mentioned the liability
of one depositor for the co-depositor's overdrafts.2 Under the
proposed bill, the withdrawals made (checks written) by the wife
would be presumed to be for the husband's benefit if he contrib-
uted the funds initially, so that her share of the overdrafts should
be correspondingly reduced.
59. 91 A.D.2d 7, 457 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1st Dep't 1982) (discussed supra notes 14-16 and
accompanying text).
60. McSweeney, 91 A.D.2d at 9, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 278 (citing Payne v. Freer, 91 N.Y. 43
(1883)). This rule has been codified in subdivision (1) of section 4-401 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 4-401(1) (1977).
61. McSweeney, 91 A.D.2d at 9, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 278. The court cited a 1966 Court of
Appeals decision, General Stencils v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125, 129, 219 N.E.2d 169, 171,
272 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340, for support. Apparently the joint tenancy concept only applies
when there is a positive balance in the account; when overdrafts occur, each co-depositor is
not allocated a moiety of the overdrawn amount.
62. In general, the joint signature cards utilized by banks for opening joint deposits
impart little information as to the rights of the co-depositors vis-i-vis each other except as
to survivorship. For further discussion on the use of various types of signature cards, see
Note, supra note 9, at 219 nn.52-55.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
As the above discussion illustrates, New York judges and leg-
islators have struggled with the law governing joint bank accounts
for some time. The frequency with which remedial legislation has
been introduced over the past several years6 3 is an implicit indica-
tion of the success encountered. In order to gauge the potential of
the most recent proposal, it is helpful to look not only at New
York law and decisions, but also at the problems encountered and
solutions enacted in other states. Two states which had exper-
ienced conflicting judicial decisions and have attempted to remedy
the situation statutorily within the past six years are Virginia and
Michigan.
A. Virginia
In 1979, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a Multiple-
Party Accounts Act," closely patterned after article VI of the
Uniform Probate Code.65 Prior to the enactment of that legisla-
tion, case law in Virginia had created a presumption that joint ac-
counts were made for the convenience of the depositor, unless the
co-depositors were husband and wife.6 Thus, except for spousal
joint accounts, the right of survivorship did not necessarily attach
even though the joint signature card provided for survivorship.
The survivor had to rebut the presumption of convenience, either
by relying on the detailed explanation printed on the bank's signa-
ture card if it was unambiguous, or by introducing extrinsic
evidence.67
The judicially created presumption as to convenience was in-
troduced into the Virginia law with no requirement of disclosure
to the depositors opening the account, in the same manner in
which present New York law presumes that joint depositors in-
tend to make a gift of half the funds in the account without in-
forming the depositors of that fact. A survey conducted by State
Senator Emmanuel R. Gold indicated that ninety percent of the
63. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
64. VA. CODE §§ 6.1-125.1 to 6.1-125.16 (1983).
65. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 to 6-113, 8 U.L.A. 520-33 (1983).
66. See Note, Multiple Party Accounts, 14 U. RicH. L. REv. 851, 853-55 (1980).
67. Id. at 853-54. The first method of rebuttal was based on contract theory, while the
second method was based on the intent of the depositor under common law gift theory.
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people questioned did not know that the law presumes joint de-
positors have rights to half the funds in an account. 8 A similar
situation has arisen due to nondisclosure of the law relating to sur-
vivorship. A 1979 survey of seven hundred Virginia users of
short-form signature cards revealed that a little over sixty-one
percent of them believed that survivorship would attach if the
forms were used by non-spousal depositors.69 Clearly the inten-
tions of depositors were not being met in Virginia under case law
and are still not being addressed by New York law.
Due to the conflicting resolution of Virginia's joint-account
cases and resulting unpredictability, the Virginia legislature en-
acted the Multiple-Party Accounts Act to replace the rebuttable
presumption of convenience with a rebuttable presumption of sur-
vivorship. The apparent advantage of replacing one presumption
with another was that the latter-survivorship-more closely con-
formed to the expectations of Virginia depositors. The Commis-
sion also has conceded that the "presumption of survivorship con-
tained in the present law probably reflects the intent of most joint
depositors" 70 yet nonetheless proposes to abolish the presumption
in New York and require the depositor to designate whether or
not survivorship is intended.7 1 The New York proposal allows the
depositor greater freedom of choice and ensures that he or she
will be made aware of the existence of the survivorship feature.
Under the Virginia Act, the ownership of funds between liv-
ing depositors to a joint account is based on net contributions, as
is the case under the Uniform Probate Code and the proposed
New. York law. This adoption of the net-contributions concept
was not a reaction to Virginia case law, as prior to the passage of
the statute there were no decisions dealing with lifetime interests
in joint accounts. All case law dealt with survivorship rights. 2 The
statute repealed by the Multiple-Party Accounts Act had provided
that joint accounts in savings and loan associations were vested in
68. Senator Gold's survey was a letter distributed to senior citizens' groups in the 13th
state senatorial district (Queens) in 1982 asking them to check one of four options they
believed would occur if a joint account was opened at a bank. Approximately 300 persons
responded to the survey, according to Jack McPadden, Legislative Director for Senator
Gold. Telephone interview with Jack McPadden (March 8, 1985).
69. Note, supra note 66, at 856 n.29.
70. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-436.
71. Id.
72. Note, supra note 66, at 853.
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the depositors as joint tenants, but studies conducted by the Vir-
ginia House Committee on Banking revealed that no true joint
tenancy existed.73 Therefore, the net contributions concept in
Virginia represented the first attempt to clearly define rights be-
tween depositors while alive. Further refinements in the area of
husband and wife accounts may be undertaken since the current
Virginia Multiple-Party Accounts Act does not distinguish these
types of accounts. In contrast, New York's proposed bill adopts
the net contributions concept in reaction to the long history of
depositors who did not intend to convey a gift of half the funds in
the account and found themselves in court trying to rebut that
presumption because they were not aware of its existence at the
time they opened the joint account. The slight administrative in-
conveniences which may arise as a result of instituting a net con-
tributions system, which available data indicate will probably be
minimal,7 ' is clearly outweighed by the merits of having the cus-
tomer's beneficial interest in an account equal the net amount of
funds he or she has deposited.
B. Michigan
In sharp contrast to the approach to the problem of multiple
accounts taken in Virginia, the Michigan legislature has incorpo-
rated into the Michigan Statutory Joint Account Act75 a require-
ment that financial institutions provide depositors who open joint
accounts with an opportunity to select exactly the type of account
which best suits their interests.7 6 The Michigan law eliminates
73. Id. at 862.
74. According to G. Philip Cheatham, Vice President and Operations Coordinator of
United Virginia Bank, Richmond, Virginia, "[i]t does take a minute or so longer to open a
new account" under the new law but the bank viewed this as "simply another law we have
to comply with along with many others." Letter from G. Philip Cheatham to Virginia Mc-
Eldowney (Dec. 12, 1983).
75. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 487.711-487.719 (West 1978).
76. Form of Statutory Joint Account Contract
1. Name of financial institution:
2. Nature of Account:
Check - Savings Account;
- Commercial Account; - Certificate of Deposit;
Other Credits (describe):
3. Name and address of person designated as A:
4. Name and address of person designated as B:
5. Who may withdraw funds during lifetime of A and B:
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both the rebuttable presumption as to half ownership of such an
account as well as the need to determine net contributions.
While the Virginia Act may not be comprehensive enough to
meet depositor's intentions," Michigan's statute may represent
too much regulation. Not only is each bank required to use the
same contract format, but each time a depositor wishes to make a
withdrawal, the bank must check the depositor's individual agree-
ment to determine whether the release of the funds requested
comports with the prior designation." New York's proposed bill
represents a compromise between these extremes in that it pro-
vides for needed substantive changes yet allows each depositor to
freely withdraw money from the account, thus avoiding the bur-
den on the bank to check the agreement before each transaction.
Under the Michigan law, a bank can set off funds in an ac-
count if the owner has another financial obligation to the bank,
Check A; B; Either A or B;
-Signatures of both A and B:
6. Who may revoke this contract by written notice to the financial institution:
Check A; B; Either A or B;
__ Signatures of both A and B. In the event of revocation, the
right to withdraw funds shall be determined by designation of owner-
ship in item 7.
7. Who owns the funds during the lifetime of A and B:
Check A; B; Equally by A and B; Other propor-
tions (describe):
8. Who owns the funds and has the right to withdraw if A dies first:
Check - B; - A's estate; Equally by B and A's estate;
Other proportions (describe):
9. Who owns the funds and has the right to withdraw if B dies first:
Check - A; - B's estate; Equally by A and B's estate;
Other proportions (describe):
10. If A and B should die simultaneously without proof of who survives, which
provision shall control:
Check __ Item 8 above; - Item 9 above.
11. Signature of persons having right of withdrawal:
12. Date of signature:
Note: (1) Each person who signs this contract shall receive a copy of this
contract and their signature shall constitute acknowledgment of receipt.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.715 (West 1978).
77. An example is the failure of Virginia's statute to distinguish husband and wife
accounts. See VA. CODE §§ 6.1-125.1 to 6.1-125.16 (1983).
78. In a "unit banking" state such as Michigan, where branching is severely restricted,
this may be feasible, but in New York (where one bank may have hundreds of branches
statewide) it is not practical to refer to a paper checklist each time a withdrawal is made.
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such as an overdue auto loan payment.7 9 Although a right of set-
off is not included in the New York banking law, financial institu-
tions do enjoy that right under the New York law governing
debtor/creditor relations.80 Under the Michigan Act, creditors
can only reach funds in the account to the extent of actual owner-
ship; this contrasts with the New York proposal, under which
creditors can reach the entire amount if proof of net contribution
is lacking.81 The Michigan provision regarding creditors' rights
seems more equitable in that it does not make any presuppositions
as to ownership of the funds if proof is lacking; the matter is left
up to the discretion of the court.82
In general, it appears that the New York proposal espouses a
policy more favorable to creditors than that of Michigan or the
Uniform Probate Code. 3 Eliminating the confusion surrounding
the moiety concept is a valid concern; however, in view of the ex-
perience of the defendants in Denton,"' a statement to the effect
that a creditor may be able to reach all the funds on deposit in a
joint account if proof of ownership is lacking should be incorpo-
rated into the disclosure requirements of General Regulation Part
15.85
III. THE NEW YORK PROPOSAL AND THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
In many respects, the proposed amendment to the New York
banking law mirrors the provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code.88 UPC section 6-103(a), dealing with ownership of joint ac-
counts during the lifetime of the parties, provides that the ac-
79. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 487.717(2) (West 1978).
80. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 151 (McKinney Supp. 1984). See, e.g., Aspen Industries
v. Marine Midland Bank, 52 N.Y.2d 575, 421 N.E.2d 808, 439 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1981) (bank
had superior right of set-off against funds in judgment debtor's account as against claim of
intervening judgment creditor).
81. See supra text accompanying note 58.
82. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 487.718 (West 1978).
83. In re Granwell, 20 N.Y.2d 91, 228 N.E.2d 779, 281 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1967). See
supra text accompanying note 58.
84. Denton v. Grumbach, 2 A.D.2d 420, 157 N.Y.S. 191 (3d Dep't 1956) (discussed
supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text).
85. Part 15.3(c) of the current General Regulation provides that "the depository may
be required by service of legal process to remit funds held in the joint account to satisfy a
judgment entered against, or other valid debt incurred by, any owner of the account." N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 153 (1984). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 10.
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count belongs to the parties in proportion to the net contributions
made by each, unless there is "clear and convincing evidence"
that the intent of the parties was otherwise. The proposed New
York law is identical except that a lesser standard of proof is re-
quired, one based on a "preponderance of evidence. ' 87 Financial
institutions are protected under both systems from liability for
payments made to a depositor prior to receipt of written notice
prohibiting payment of any sums on deposit in accordance with
the terms of the account.8' In addition, the financial institution is
not obligated under either plan to inquire into the source of the
funds received for deposit or the purposes for which withdrawn
sums will be used. 9
The UPC and the proposed New York statute differ as to sur-
vivorship rights. The UPC provides that "[s]ums remaining on de-
posit at the death of a party to a joint account belong to the sur-
viving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless
there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at
the time the account is created."9' In contrast, the New York bill
requires financial institutions to provide each joint depositor with
the option of choosing whether or not he or she desires to have
the property pass to the survivor upon the death of the deposi-
tor." The idea of giving depositors an option regarding survivor-
ship at the time the account is opened rather than leaving the
question for litigation is attractive in that it involves no extra re-
cordkeeping responsibility for any party, allows customers input as
to their intentions, and clarifies the position of the depositors,
thereby fulfilling the mandate of recently-passed section 675(c).
9 2
The depositor's decision regarding survivorship can be revoked,
terminated, or modified by either withdrawing sums from the ac-
count or by a written document signed by all co-depositors. Fol-
lowing UPC section 6-104(e), the proposed New York survivor-
ship provision would not be revocable by testamentary disposition;
87. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-447 (proposed § 682(a)).
88. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-112, 8 U.L.A. 532 (1983); See Commission Report, supra
note 2, at A-449 (proposed § 684(b)).
89. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-108, 8 U.L.A. 530-31 (1983); See Commission Report, supra
note 2, at A-449 (proposed § 684(a)).
90. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-104(a), 8 U.L.A. 525 (1983).
91. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-448 (proposed § 683).
92. The primary purpose of the elective right of survivorship, however, is undoubt-
edly to ensure that the customer is notified that the right exists.
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the Commission suggested that revocability would be unnecessary
given the other methods available to revoke survivorship.9 3 In the
interests of reducing will contests it would seem that revocation by
testamentary disposition is not necessary since the depositor may
unilaterally revoke survivorship by withdrawal of the funds.
The UPC provides a more detailed statutory scheme in the
area of creditor's rights than does the New York proposal. Section
6-107 of the UPC provides that a surviving party who receives
payment from a multiple-party account after the death of the co-
depositor is accountable to the deceased's personal representative
for any amounts the deceased owned beneficially prior to death,
to the extent necessary to discharge claims against his estate if the
other assets are insufficient. 4 The New York bill simply grants
creditors the right to that portion of the account to which the
depositor was beneficially entitled, based on net contributions, up
to the entire amount in the account.9 5 By comparison, the New
York bill sounds harsh, but the net result would be the same if the.
amount the deceased owned beneficially prior to death were de-
terminable. Under the UPC, if proof of net contribution were
lacking, the courts presumably would be called upon to decide an
equitable division of the funds.9 Although the New York bill
flatly states that a creditor in that same situation is entitled to "the
entire sum on deposit in the account, 91 7 the effects of the New
York law governing estates, powers, and trusts must also be con-
sidered. Under that law, a one thousand d6llar exemption is avail-
able for the benefit of a surviving spouse, which sum is vulnerable
to depletion by the personal representative of the deceased's es-
tate in an amount required to pay funeral expenses if other estate
assets are insufficient.98 Thus, limited protection from creditors
(other than those with -funeral-related claims) is afforded the sur-
93. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-439-40.
94. Such claims would include any debts, taxes owed, administrative expenses, and
statutory allowances to the surviving spouse and children. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-107, 8
U.L.A. 529-30 (1983).
95. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
96. This assumption as to how the courts would act is based on language in the com-
ment to section 6-103 relating to the division of an account when parties fail to prove net
contributions: "undoubtedly a court would divide the account equally among the parties to
the extent that net contributions cannot be proven." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-103, com-
ment, 8 U.L.A. 523-25 (1983).
97. Commission Report, supra note 2, at A-449 (proposed § 685).
98. N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.1(a)(4) (McKinney 1981).
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viving spouse or child in New York.
It seems that it would be preferable to leave the determina-
tion as to the amount of funds subject to creditors' interests to the
wisdom of the courts on a case-by-case basis rather than risk turn-
ing over to creditors funds which did not belong to the deceased.
If this is not done, creditors might receive money to which they
are simply not entitled, at the expense of a non-debtor depositor,
as occurred in Denton.99
CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 675(c) and the adoption of General
Regulation Part 15 are positive steps toward achieving the goal of
increased consumer understanding. Nevertheless, if the substan-
tive legal foundation underlying the disclosed information is not
meshed with the intentions of a major share of the depositors, the
basic dilemma remains unsolved. As Senator Gold's study sug-
gests,10 0 ninety percent of the population may not realize that ei-
ther person named in the joint account can legally sue for half of
the funds deposited therein. Informing customers that they will
own the funds on deposit as joint tenants, without further expla-
nation as to the ramifications of that terminology, does nothing to
increase their awareness as to the rights they enjoy. At present,
joint signature cards do not mention the "present gift of one-
half" presumption and there is no reference to the concept in the
section of the Savings Bank Association of New York State's train-
ing manual dealing with the opening of new multiple-party ac-
counts.10 1 It is not necessary to mandate that the signature form
be standardized since this could result in problems for banks, each
of which has its own system of recording account information. As
long as the bank's application form meets certain basic standards,
such as compliance with the New York Plain Language Law,10 2 a
concise explanation of the concept of net contributions, in both
spousal and non-spousal situations, and a provision relating to the
right of survivorship, potential depositors will be able to create
joint accounts adapted to their individual requirements to a far
99. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
100. See supra note 68.
101. COMMrEE ON BANK OPERATIONS AND SERVICES, SAVINGS BANKS ASSOCIATION OF
NEW YORK STATT, MANUAL OF BANK OPERATIONS 205.1 (1979).
102. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (McKinney 1978).
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greater extent than is possible under the current law."'3
VIRGINIA C. MCELDOWNEY
103. As this Comment went to press, the Law Revision Commission released a pro-
posed statutory joint account contract for use by banks in New York which does not discuss
the net contributions concept. In other respects, this proposed contract meets the criteria
suggested in the Comment and would be a major improvement over the present use of
noninformative joint signature cards. The proposed contract is set forth below:
STATUTORY JOINT ACCOUNT CONTRACT BETWEEN JOINT DEPOSITORS
(This contract does not affect the bank)
ACCOUNT INFORMATION
1. Name and address of financial institution:
2. Number of the account:
3. Type of account:*
4. Name and address of depositor A:
5. Name and address of depositor B:
1. THE PERSONS WHO CAN WITHDRAW MONEY FROM THE ACCOUNT
Either A or B may withdraw any or all of the money in this account.
This right to withdraw can be canceled only by a written notice received by the
bank from either A or B.
II. WHILE A AND B ARE BOTH ALIVE, WHO IS TO OWN ANY MONEY DEPOS-
ITED IN THIS ACCOUNT?
Please answer this question by checking one of the three boxes below.
NOTE No matter which box is checked, any or all of the money can still be with-
drawn from the account by either A or B. The bank has no duty to ask why money is
withdrawn or how it is to be spent after it is withdrawn.
While both A and B are alive the money deposited in this account belongs to
1. Only A 0 2. Only BO 3. Both A and BO
III. IF A DIES BEFORE B, IS B (THE SURVIVOR) TO OWN THE BALANCE OF
THE ACCOUNT?
Yes 0 No 0
IV. IF B DIES BEFORE A, IS A (THE SURVIVOR) TO OWN THE BALANCE OF
THE ACCOUNT?
Yes 0 No 0
Signature of Depositors: A
Date B
Each depositor is to receive a copy of this contract.
* The types of accounts shall be limited to those authorized by certificate, regulation or
statute for use by the financial institution in which the account is established.

